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Abstract Along with political unrest since the Arab spring, the stakes of the
Mediterranean neighbourhood are numerous: social booming disparities, gender gap,
numeric illiteracy, critical case of water supply and agricultural land, difﬁcult
decentralisation and state de-concentration. But opportunities are still wider: the
Mediterranean is the only neighbourhood whose population and GDP’s world share
is growing; the rent economy is (slowly) shifting towards a more productive econ-
omy with a rising role of clusters; huge investment needs mean huge opportunities
for European investors. Secondly, the chapter assesses the trends in economic
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regional integration (“regionalisation”), showing that the Euro-Mediterranean
missing link remains the productive integration. It estimates the importance of the
European aid and the normative convergence of norms and standards between the
two sides of the Mediterranean (“regionalism”). Its strategic recommendations stress
four needs: (i) a common water policy so as to avoid water wars; a food security and
agricultural policy; a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community; turning the “migra-
tion” vision to a “mobility” strategy. In the very difﬁcult transition of Arab neigh-
bours, time calls for a political boldness in Euromed cooperation.
6.1 Stakes
Contrary to what the European public opinion often thinks and to what Muslim
fundamentalists advocate, the South and East Mediterranean partner countries (Map
6.1) are far from constituting one whole uniﬁed territory.
6.1.1 The Only Neighbourhood Whose Population
and GDP’s World Share Is Growing
There are large differences between the various countries of the Mediterranean
neighbourhood—between Israel and all the other much less developed countries;
between Turkey and the Arab countries; between countries whose population will soon
be a hundred million and countries of less than ten; between oil and gas providers and
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Map 6.1 The Mediterranean neighbourhood
energy importers; between Maghreb and Mashreq; between countries at war and less
affected countries; between the occupied Palestinian territory and the rest of Mashreq
because the Palestinian case has absolutely no equivalent. Still, some common features
can be highlighted. This neighbourhood is the only one whose share in the world’s
population and GDP is rising. The annual growth rate of its GDP is impressive even
though still far from the growth rates that made the south-eastern Asian Dragons and
Tigers key countries of the booming East Asian region a few decades ago. With
285 million inhabitants, theMediterranean neighbours are by far the premier European
neighbourhood and this will increasingly be the case. In 2025, the Mediterranean
number could be around 340 million, and 460 with the Arabic peninsula and Iraq that
is to say the Arabic immediate lengthening of the Mediterranean neighbours. Another
asset of this neighbourhood is its natural resources, namely energetic.
The bad news is (i) the environmental sharp stakes of this area, in particular the
water issue thus the agricultural issue since agriculture consumes the three quarters
of available water there. (ii) The energetic transition, which is not granted. The
business-as-usual scenario foresees a Mediterranean energy mix largely dominated
by hydrocarbons, with low energetic efﬁciency and poorly sustainable urban growth
(urban sprawl, choice of car transport…). (iii) The economic and political transition,
which is on its way but could take a very long time, with conflicts and wars. (iv) As
Sect. 2 showed, a neighbourhood less and less connected to Europe, especially the
East Mediterranean where the influence of the Gulf countries is growing, with
declining common social, cultural and political references with Europe.
Figure 6.1 shows that the vast majority of the remittances that arrive in Morocco
come from Europe which means intense flows of migrants and money but also
information, ideas and references. Youssef Courbage (Courbage and Todd 2007)
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Fig. 6.1 The eastern Mediterranean evades European influence. The case of remittances, 2010
considers the mobility flows between Maghreb and Europe one driver of the
acculturation between the two sides of the Mediterranean, including transformation
of the Maghreb’s family structures, namely the rapid decline of the fertility rate. On
the contrary, a tiny part of the remittances that arrive in Egypt come from Europe;
this is a good proxy for measuring the European contrasted influence upon the
western and eastern Mediterranean partner countries. Most of remittances coming to
Mashreq countries are from the Gulf.
Territories are hardly at the top of these countries’ political agenda, because they
are rarely seen as an asset for development. When the relation between territories and
development is taken into account, it is all too often according to the rent economy
that characterizes the Mediterranean neighbours—be it tourism, real estates,
hydrocarbons revenues, Suez Canal’s revenues, remittance or international aid, due
to the lack of a modern production system except in Turkey. When the ﬁrst Tunisian
revolutionary government took ofﬁce in January 2011, they were struck by the
importance of the territorial divide that had been highlighted by the social unrest.
The revolution had broken out in Sidi Bouzid, a city of the derelict inner Tunisia.
The Tunisians themselves had not taken into account the dimension of territorial
inequality; hence it has become a critical issue of the on-going political transition.
The organisation of space in the South and East of the Mediterranean is marked by
the concentration of the settlements on a narrow littoralmargin of the territory, including
a signiﬁcant rural density—at least in territories ﬁt for agriculture—and a rapid urban
growth. This neighbourhood is experiencing, at the same time, major challenges in its
rural areas (rising pressure on agricultural land, impact of the rainfall shortage, risks of a
straight food trade liberalisation with Europe, high rural density especially in Morocco
and Egypt), and major challenges in its urban areas. Today Mediterranean partner
countries’ cities count 190 million inhabitants and four more million every year. The
population’s urban rate was 64 % in 2004, it will be over 75 % in 2025.
The transport networks are incomplete (Map 6.1). Despite on-going progress, for
example the Maghreb coastal motorway project (without connection yet between
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Morocco and Algeria), huge infrastructures remain to be built, in particular in the
railway networks. The map displays impressive contrasts—spectacular in Egypt—
between the urbanised space and the arid lands. The only exception to this pattern is
Turkey, were the inner Anatolia beneﬁts from an overall network of transport and
cities that somehowmeshes the territory, within the country andwith the EU thanks to
the territorial continuity permitted by the Istanbul bridges—a major difference with
the Arab countries. In this neighbourhood, the various political discrepancies
entangle the transnational links between Morocco and Algeria, between Egypt, Israel
and the occupied Palestinian territory, and now between Syria and its neighbours.
6.1.2 Demographic Gift: Territorial Impacts
The Mediterranean neighbour countries are experiencing the “demographic gift”
phase, during which a country beneﬁts from a large number of young adults (“youth
bulge”) who are available for their country’s development without bearing the
burden of a large amount of younger any longer (ending of the numerous family
phase) and of elder (on-going raising of the life expectancy thanks to the devel-
opment of the country). The young adults are ready for development—or for unrest
if the country does not offer them the jobs they need. Many revolutions in history
have occurred in this peculiar demographic gift moment; as did the Arab spring.
The important “oldies boom” is well-known in Europe and its Eastern neigh-
bourhood. This can be considered a burden, when it comes to the pensions and
health expenditures. It can be considered an asset, when it comes to know-how in a
knowledge economy where a rising part of skills are incremental and develop with
age, up to a certain extent. The aging of both Europe and the Eastern neighbour-
hood means a convergence of social structure and possible cooperation. Pension
reform in the East can be inspired by the various solutions within the European
Union; the health care issue can bring exchange of experiences of public policies,
institutional and personal medical staff cooperation, and business links in the ﬁeld
of drugs or medical equipment. What is less known is the coming oldies boom in
the Mediterranean neighbourhood, especially in North Africa where the demo-
graphic transition and the decline of the birth rate are strikingly rapid. The speed of
this demographic transition will raise the ﬁnancial and health problem in respect of
the elder population in the coming decades. This suggests avenues for a new
possible cooperation with Europe. Today’s oldies boom is European, West and
East; tomorrow it will clearly expand in the Mediterranean (Map 6.2).
6.1.3 Addressing Social Booming Disparities, Gender Gap
and Numeric Illiteracy
The Mediterranean neighbour countries display the highest rates in the world for the
gender gap in activity (a very low percentage of women are ofﬁcially active) and in
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employment (11 points between the two unemployment rates). In North Africa,
41 % of young females of 15–24 year old are unemployed. This gender issue is of
high signiﬁcance, for two reasons:
(i) The tangible situation of women proves difﬁcult. Women in rural areas have
terribly low ﬁgures in terms of literacy and access to the labour market. Map 6.3
shows, in the case of Maghreb, that the access of girls to education has dra-
matically improved, but that it will take a long time before their access to the
labour market becomes equal to that of men. The contrast is striking in Algeria
where there are many more girls in the secondary education than boys but where
young women’ access to the labour market confronts many obstacles. This
contrast is particularly strong in the East and in the largest cities—Algiers, Oran,
Constantine—which promises further clashes when these more and more edu-
cated girls want to take their place in national activity.
(ii) The status of women vis-à-vis men has a lot to do with the cultural and
symbolic closeness of those Mediterranean neighbours vis-à-vis Europe where
equality between individuals, whatever their gender, is the very foundation of
the social contract.
Indeed, the huge need for employment in this neighbourhood goes far beyond
the gender issue. In the twenty coming decades, these countries would need the
creation of at least forty million jobs just to avoid an increase of the unemployment
Map 6.2 Population 60 and over in 2010 and 2050: the coming oldies boom in North Africa.
Source Valerie Golaz, Ined
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Map 6.3 The gender issue viewed through access to education and to the labour market. Case of
Maghreb
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rate. The employment of the young is the main focus of the “Trade and investment”
panel of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, which gathers repre-
sentatives of countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region. In its latest report (PAM
2014), this panel states that 28 % of the young active are unemployed in the South
and East Mediterranean partner countries, and this unemployment rate is foreseen to
rise in the coming years. A large proportion of graduate young adults cannot ﬁnd
any jobs, due to the inadequacy of the training system for the labour market and to
the scarcity of job creation. It should be added that a lot of 15–18 year olds drop out
of school without ﬁnding a job. As a result, 40 % of 15–24 year old Moroccans are
allegedly neither at school nor at work.
For income analysis, this time we take the example of Near East. In Israel, many of
the geographical differences are driven by the “ethnic”—read “religious”—compo-
sition of the area. The greater the share of Palestinians (the major areas of Palestinian
settlements are in the northern district of Israel where 700,000 Palestinians live),
ultraorthodox Jews, and Mizrahi Jews in a district, the poorer the district is and the
lower the socioeconomic standing of its population. In 1995 as at the end of the 2000s,
household incomewas higher in the Central district, then theWest Bank and TelAviv,
and lowest in Jerusalem, the South and the North. The median household income of
Palestinian families of Israel in 1995 was about 60 % of that of Jewish households; in
2008 it was 54 %. Note that this Jewish/Palestinian gap in household income is
underestimated because it is not adjusted for household size. This rising territorial
disparity is to be linked with the rising social disparity which has been booming in the
last two decades in Israel. In that ﬁeld, the country is muchmore like the US trajectory
where the richest 1 % of Americans has come to earn more than 15 % of the national
income, than like the European and especially the Scandinavian pattern. In that sense
too, a Near East country seems to move away European standards.
In the occupied Palestinian territory, the highest daily wage is registered in
Jerusalem metropolitan area including Ramallah and Bethlehem, with 109 NIS in the
Jerusalem governorate whilst the lowest is in Khan Younis governorate in the
southern Gaza Strip with 56 NIS, that is to say an enormous gap. The construction of
the Wall encompassing the whole Jerusalem area will then hamper the economic
development of the occupied Palestinian territory inwhich the Jerusalemmetropolitan
area plays a leading role—as indeed in many countries of the world, namely devel-
oping countries, where the capital city is the driver of national development.
Jordan remains a poor country. According to the Jordan Poverty Reduction
Strategy 2013, 36.9 % of Jordanian families are considered to be in poverty or
floating just above the poverty line. Most poverty pockets are located in sparsely
populated desert areas; very low average incomes per family are found in the
remote periphery of Amman: Madaba, Balqa’ and Zarqa. As food still accounts for
one third of Jordan households’ expenditure, the population is very sensitive to
variations in commodity prices and to the removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs.
The abrupt removal of subsidies is likely to lead to social unrest, as was the case
during the spring of 1989 in the impoverished and neglected southern parts of
Jordan, as well as in 1998 and 2002 in Ma‘an, and in 2012 with huge demon-
strations. Moreover, income inequality has risen in the last period, with a growing
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contrast between the Amman governorate and the rest of the country. This
inequality is as high as in the occupied Palestinian territory, and bigger than in
Israel which comparably proves less uneven (Fig. 6.2). In Jordan, analysis at a more
local scale worsens the picture: the income rise seems concentrated in the western
Amman city, where most of the well-off neighbourhoods are situated (Fig. 6.3).
Map 6.4 shows the added value of the pioneer ITAN database, which allows
international comparison at a local scale.
We return to the Maghreb to illustrate the IT issue. It is both social (notion of
“numeric illiteracy”), economic (access to the knowledge economy), and political
(see the importance of the connexion to Europe of the revolutionary leading
Fig. 6.2 Local income disparities in the Near East (national average = 100). oPt and Jordan still
more unequal than Israel in terms of geographical disparities
Fig. 6.3 Average income in
Jordan governorates and in
Amman sub-districts, 2006–
2010
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bloggers in Tunisia, Map 6.5). Currently, many Mediterranean projects deal with
telecommunications, for instance in the e-commerce ﬁeld or international e-learning
cooperation. These projects depend on the development and use of broadband
facilities. To date, these countries are quite well equipped when it comes to mobile
phones (with major international buyouts in the recent years), but less so for internet
users. The prospects for telecommunication markets are impressive. Despite the
Map 6.4 Income inequality in the Near East (Israel, occupied Palestinian territory, Jordan), ca
2011
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lack of ﬁxed telephone main lines, which could hamper the rise of internet and
e-services in the long run, the proportion of broadband subscribers is booming. Yet,
Map 6.6 shows the households’ under-equipment in computer in many areas of
Algeria and Tunisia, especially in the former. Compared to the dualistic Algerian
ﬁgure where the coastal large urban regions contrast with the inner country, the
equipment of the national territory is better in Tunisia. Still, only one household out
of ten has a computer in the Kasserine, Beja and Zaghouan Tunisian governorates
in inner Tunisia; one can imagine than in the rural parts of these governorates the
rate could not reach 5 %.
6.1.4 Territories and Economic Issues: Small but Rising
Role of Clusters, Huge Investments Needs
Territories have much to do with economic development. Clusters can be of great
help in the shift towards an innovative productive economy. Turkey, Tunisia and
Morocco are developing science parks and clusters (Map 6.7), along with Israel of
course which is very far ahead among the Mediterranean neighbours. The European
Investment Bank (EIB) sees a priority axis of its strategy in the area in such clusters
and innovation.
Map 6.5 Connected with Europe. The international links of the Tunisian revolutionary leading
bloggers at the beginning of 2011. Source Giraud and Severo (2011)
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In these countries, urbanisation hardly turns into an engine for development.
Urbanisation is at the same time a risk (concentration of people left behind) and an
opportunity: when properly planned and managed, cities are a major means for
economic innovation. Besides, the Arab neighbour territories suffer from low land
tenure security, lack of cadastre and land registry, and under-investment in the basic
infrastructures: water sanitation, waste facilities, urban and inter-urban transport,
poor logistic efﬁciency because bureaucracy and corruption extend the delivery
times.
The EIB forecasts that in the coming decades, the need to ﬁnance energy,
facilities and urban services of the Mediterranean partner countries should be
approximately $250 bn: 100 billion for energy, 110 for urban facilities such as
water, sanitation, waste, local transports, education, health; 20 for national and
international transport (ports, airports, motorways). And it should be added the
Map 6.6 The key role of IT in the Mediterranean integration. “Numeric illiteracy” in Tunisia and
Algeria, 2011
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ﬁnancial need for SMEs in order to help them create the millions of jobs that they
need.
The Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie1 (2011) estimates that this “en-
ergy 100 bn” ﬁgure is seriously under evaluated. In the 1970s, the per capita energy
consumption differential between the southern and the northern sides of the
Mediterranean stood at 1:8; by 2000 it had fallen to 1:4, and within ten years it is
expected to fall to 1:2. The ﬁnancial need for the sole electricity sector (power
generation and transport lines that should be constructed up to 2020) is $150 bn.
For the gas sector, numbers are huge: in the region, an international gas pipe costs
roughly $10 bn, an LNG plant, the equipment and pipes linked to it, can cost up to
Map 6.7 Clusters in Maghreb
1This non-proﬁt Association counts thirty two leading Mediterranean energy companies from
fourteen countries. Its main objective is to promote cooperation of the companies operating in the
Mediterranean region, making energy a key element for regional integration.
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$1 bn. To summarise, the overall cost of energy infrastructures in Mediterranean
neighbour countries is closer to $200 bn than 100.
The Plan Bleu2 estimates that the required amount to meet the need for access of
all Mediterranean neighbourhood’s people to fresh water is at least €15 bn, and
35 bn for sanitation. Even if it mobilises many donors and has an emblematic
dimension, the EU’s sanitation programme “Horizon 2020” will not cover it since
its budget is around 3 bn. Moreover, the cost of the adaptation of this neighbour-
hood to climate change could reach $40 bn in the two coming decades. This
represents at, the same time, a tremendous stake and a major opportunity for
business.
Can those countries ﬁnance such enormous amounts? For the time being, except
Turkey and of course Israel, they remain very far from the European investment
average per capita, even if the gap is reducing. Related to GDP, investment in
Mediterranean neighbour countries remains lower than in India and much lower
than in China; nevertheless, the amount has doubled during the 2000s. This is
conﬁrmed by foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows, which were less than
3 billion dollars annually in the early 1990s, 7 in the late 1990s, and 30 in 2007–
2008 for the sole Arab partner countries, before the European crisis and then the
Arab spring backlash.
A lesson derived from the Anima database on FDI used in the ITAN project, is
that inflows do not only go to the richest areas. Indeed the large cities appear as
major targets, but the geography is much wider spread than one could have thought.
This means two things: (i) attracting foreign investment has become a shared goal
and practise in these countries, conﬁrming the Mediterranean partner countries’
general openness to international exchange; (ii) FDIs are more inclusive than
feared. In these countries, a tough debate has emerged between those in favour of
international, namely European, influence upon their economy, and opponents
saying that such FDI create too low a number of jobs and have no actual spill over
effect on SMEs and territories. At least according to Map 6.8, one can say that this
territorial argument is not obvious.
That being said, the second map, focusing on advanced manufacturing and
services sectors, is limited to the leading metropolitan areas: Israel as a whole,
Istanbul, and to some extent Casablanca and Tunis. At least, this proves that these
countries can henceforward attract something other than low tech factories such as
the clothing industry. The rising foreign investment in the automotive (see Renault
car plant in Tangier-Med) and aerospace industries suggest that these
Mediterranean partner countries could be regarded with an eye different from the
classic “periphery” vision highlighted above. They could become the “Tigers” of
the European region.
2The Plan Bleu has been launched by the UNEP Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean in 1976. Its objective is to
contribute to raising awareness of Mediterranean stakeholders and decision makers concerning
environment and sustainable development issues in the region, by providing future scenarios to
assist in decision-making.
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6.1.5 Environment: The Critical Case of Water
and Agricultural Land
According to the IPCC’s scenarios and along with north-western India, the impact
of climate change in the coming century will not be harder anywhere in the world
than in the Mediterranean area (Hallegatte et al. 2009). Today, 35 million people in
these countries do not have access to sanitation facilities, 20 million to fresh water.
The water shortage will become harder; the arid part of this territory could then
increase, agricultural modernisation could be insufﬁcient for tackling the utmost
dependence of these countries vis-à-vis food imports.
A research programme spearheaded by Inra-Cirad (2009) tracks the long-term
trends of six major regions of the world and provides scenarios for agriculture and
food through to 2050. Between 2003 and 2050 the population of the Middle East
Map 6.8 The local FDI inflows in the Mediterranean neighbour countries. Not only large urban
areas, not only low tech. Source FDI 2008–2012 Anima—MIPO/cartography by CIST
6 Mediterranean Neighbourhood: The Key Triptych … 165
and North Africa (MENA) region is set to have 70 % more people; food and
agricultural demand (expressed in energy equivalents: vegetable and animal kilo-
calories) is expected to rise by 80 %; due to expected improvements in product
quality, the market in value terms will rise from 100 to 200 % over the period.
MENA, some parts of which were ancient Rome’s grain basket, has become the
world region with the highest level of food stress: in 2003, the gap between local
resources and consumption hit 54 % of the total supply, and by 2050 it is expected
to more than double. On a per capita basis, by 2050 the gap will be three times
greater than in sub-Saharan Africa. Three factors explain this food supply crunch:
the scarcity of land available for agriculture; climate degradation and particularly
the dramatic water shortage; institutional weaknesses that are hampering technical
and managerial progress in the sector (Figs. 6.4, 6.5). The regional instability has a
major impact too, especially on Irakian and Syrian agriculture.
Table 6.1 gives the numbers for cereal production and imports, according to four
scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario is the baseline and drives to a production per inhabitant
of 80 % compared to that of the 2000s, and to almost doubled imports. The third
(severe climate change scenario) and the fourth (food trade total liberalisation) lead
to imports multiplied by three compared to that of the 2000s. The combination of
severe climate change and straight liberalisation (S3+S4) would lead to mush-
rooming imports. The only scenario where production per inhabitant does not
diminish and where imports remain bearable, is that of a deep Euro-Mediterranean
cooperation. Given the still great share of agriculture in employment in the various
Mediterranean partner countries, it is easy to understand that the future of their rural
Fig. 6.4 2050 outlook for agro-business in the Middle-East and North Africa (in vegetable and
animal kilocalories per day). Source Inra-Cirad (2009): Agrimonde
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territories will largely depend on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Even in coun-
tries such as Algeria where agriculture plays a minor role, this is a key issue because
the state, thanks to its recent Politique de Renouveau Agricole et Rural, wants to
reduce its dependence upon food imports and to enhance its agricultural sector
which had been left behind in the ﬁrst decades of the republic.
Fig. 6.5 Population and
agricultural land 2050 outlook
for MENA countries. Source
Inra-Cirad (2009): Agrimonde
Table 6.1 Cereals production and imports in the Mediterranean neighbour countries (except
Turkey) in 2030
Production Imports
Million t kg/inhab. Index Million t
Average 2000/2007: 77 261 100 37
Scenarios 2030
S1—Baseline trend 78 210 81 62
S2—Euro-Mediterranean deep cooperation 95 256 98 45
S3—Severe climate change 47 126 48 93
S4—Total food trade liberalisation 51 138 53 89
S3 + S4—Worst-case scenario 24 66 25 116
Notes
Imports estimated as the difference between consumption and production. We take into account the
average consumption per inhabitant of the 2000–2007 period
Source Cheriet et al. (2010)
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6.1.6 Difﬁcult Decentralisation
The success of the Islamic parties since the Arab spring is largely due to the state’s
deﬁciencies in local territories, progressively offset by Islamist associations. The
decentralisation issue has long been entangled in this contradiction: authoritarian
regimesdid (do) notwant to empower local governments inorder to avoid empowering
the Islamists, but by avoiding doing so, they hamper necessary local development.
Municipalities are ancient institutions in the Arab world since they were laun-
ched in the mid-19th century at the time of the Ottoman modernisation (Tanzimat).
They were reinforced by the European states during the colony or mandate period,
on English or French patterns that were, in most cases, incorporated by independent
states (Tourret and Wallaert 2010). During the last decade, the Arab partner
countries have enhanced their decentralisation and given more responsibilities to
local authorities but before the Arab spring, decentralisation remained viewed by
the regimes as a risk for security and for national unity vis-à-vis the Berber
regionalism (Morocco, Algeria), the Islamist danger (Egypt) or communitarian
fragmentation (Near East). Everything changed after the Arab spring with a general
call for a genuine decentralisation.
At a higher scale, that of regions, the only country that launched a credible
reform is Morocco; but even there the country analysis shows that the state rep-
resentative, the Wali, holds the real regional power. As a matter of fact, Arab
neighbours would need a better regional de-concentration of state power, as an
indispensable stage before decentralisation. The problem is that they did not
manage the former whereas the already have to set up the latter (Beckouche 2011a).
The Arab country which is most likely to launch a real decentralisation might be
Tunisia. The new constitution (2014) acknowledges decentralisation as a key prin-
ciple of governance. Local authorities (municipalities, districts and regions) now
have legal personality, and administrative and ﬁnancial autonomy. They can also run
decentralized cooperation—that is to say international cooperation with foreign
counterparts. If the foreseen reform actually comes into force, it will open large ﬁelds
of cooperation, in particular with European local authorities who have a strong
background in the ﬁelds of planning, public services delivery and local democracy.
6.2 Regionalism and Regionalisation
in the Euro-Mediterranean Space
6.2.1 Regionalisation: The Euro-Mediterranean Missing
Link Is Productive Integration
Over the last ﬁfteen years, Mediterranean partner countries’ exports have certainly
increased exponentially, but imports have increased even more. With the exception
of the hydrocarbon-producing countries, merchandise trade surpluses have declined
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dramatically since 2001, particularly in relation to Europe, evidence that their
production systems have not been adapted to the new global environment.
According to the Forum euroméditerranéen des instituts de sciences économiques
(FEMISE) reports, their technological level of exports has not shifted towards more
labour and technology-intensive products. The proportion of intra-industry trade
has grown only slowly with Europe, demonstrating that despite recent advances we
still have far to go in value sharing between the northern and southern
Mediterranean.
In a study on the European Euro-Mediterranean policy’s assessment, Beckouche
(2011b) shows that, for ﬁve countries studied (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and
Syria), Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA) received from the European Union
corresponded to less than 0.3 % of their GDP in 2008, in contrast to other sectors
that play a determining role in external balances: tourism revenue (8.5 % of GDP),
migrant remittances (6.1 %), FDI (5.3 %) and, negatively and most signiﬁcantly, the
collapse of the trade balance (−13.9 %). It has become clear, especially since the
early 2000s, that the economic future of the Arab countries is dependent on
the international positioning of their production systems (trade balance and FDI).
Neither tourism revenue nor migrant remittances, much less European subsidies,
can offset declines in this area.
Even more troublesome, Europe’s share in the foreign trade of Mediterranean
partner countries appears to have reversed for all countries with the exception of
Morocco (stagnation). One would think that the gradual establishment of the
Euromed free-trade area would lead Mediterranean partner countries to greater
openness amongst themselves and to the rest of the world. In reality, however, a
large part of this extra-regional openness is due to the handicaps of
Euro-Mediterranean integration: (i) poor North-South production integration (with
the exception of Turkey), (ii) high non-tariff barriers preventing access to European
agricultural and other markets and even greater barriers to the markets of individual
Mediterranean partner countries, (iii) technical (inadequate quality of cross-border
infrastructures) and monetary (limited currency convertibility) obstacles to trade
between these economies in spite of the Agadir and GAFTA agreements between
Arab countries, (iv) poor liberalisation of services.
Since the Barcelona process launched in 1995, the impact of the Euromed
agreements on regional trade has been positive but limited and declining over time
due to (i) gradual elimination of the multi-ﬁbre agreement that these Mediterranean
economies once enjoyed in comparison to Asian countries, (ii) the EU’s signing of
preferential agreements with central and eastern Europe and (iii) the effects of the
EU’s restrictive policy concerning agricultural trade (Abdallah 2011). In goods
trade as well as in FDI flows, South-South exchanges in the Mediterranean
neighbourhood have improved but remain low. The South-South market frag-
mentation serves as a further disincentive for FDI in the region. The European share
in Mediterranean partner countries’ FDI inflows has declined from more than 50 %
a decade ago to barely one third in 2010. Moreover, FDI amounts have fluctuated at
the mercy of a small number of major transactions typically associated with pri-
vatisations. Only Turkey has successfully leveraged its FDI inflows as a virtuous
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circle of technological intensiﬁcation on the part of investors to increase the export
competitiveness of their operations in Turkey. In the other Mediterranean partner
economies, FDI is directed excessively into tourism, real estate or one-off (by their
nature) privatisation transactions and has not had the catalytic effect experienced in
countries that support FDI inflows with strong savings and production-oriented
economies. These ﬁgures help in understanding the overall low connection between
Europe and its neighbours, as shown in Chap. 2.
The Anima database conﬁrms the previous statement derived from UNCTAD
data. In the period 2008–2012, FDIs to the Mediterranean neighbours were sig-
niﬁcant only for the Gulf countries, Turkey and Italy. For the major western
European countries, this neighbourhood represents less than 9 % of the FDI out-
flows target and even less than 6 % for France, Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium
(Map 6.9).
Related to the productive economy issue, three main topics were overlooked in
Barcelona. The ﬁrst is ﬁnancial and monetary cooperation with respect to foreign
exchange, an issue pushed to the forefront during the international ﬁnancial crisis—
even though banking consortia bringing together institutions on both shores are
beginning to appear. Second is agriculture, despite the constant claim of the
Ciheam.3 Last but not least is professional mobility, recognition of credentials,
professional qualiﬁcations and facilitation of movement within Euro-Mediterranean
regional labour markets. In particular, Europe is losing the battle for attracting the
Mediterranean neighbours’ qualiﬁed labour forces particularly in the eastern
Mediterranean. For example, only 1 out 6 high-level Jordanian students enrolled
abroad, come to Europe; the majority of the high skilled East Mediterranean people
living abroad live in northern America. This is all the more unfortunate in that
except singular countries such as Lebanon, outmigration of skilled people could be
win–win and not a brain drain. It is impossible to speak of any Euro-Mediterranean,
and further, Euro-Med-Africa regional integration with so many obstacles to peo-
ple’s movements (see Map 6.10 on deaths while crossing the Mediterranean). In
short, integration of the Mediterranean continues to be more trade-oriented than
production-oriented. Economic integration has been weak overall and shallow
rather than deep by any deﬁnition.
Primary responsibility for these shortcomings falls directly on the neighbours’
regimes. Growth there has been more quantitative than qualitative due to the poor
quality of national policies in the areas of training, research and technology and
weak productivity gains. It is far from sufﬁcient to offset problems of underem-
ployment, including amongst the highly skilled. Competition has admittedly
become more open, but there is still a long way to go both internationally, since the
Arab countries remain amongst the most protectionist worldwide, and within their
3The International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM) is an
intergovernmental organisation composed of thirteen member states (Albania, Algeria, Egypt,
France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey). It pro-
motes multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean in the ﬁelds of agriculture, food, ﬁshery and
rural territories.
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countries where markets continue to lack transparency. This openness has conse-
quently failed to generate sufﬁcient impact to stimulate job creation, one of the main
challenges of the economic democracy ushered in by the Arab Spring.
6.2.2 Regionalism: European Aid Too Small and Too
Scattered to Really Impact the Mediterranean
Did European donors address the regional de-integration in the Mediterranean? The
answer is threefold, and it is negative: subsidies are small, scattered, and hardly
focused on the productive system modernisation.
EU member states have reduced their share of aid to the Mediterranean neigh-
bourhood primarily to the beneﬁt of Africa for the last decade or more. Compared
to EU member states, the European Commission places greater emphasis on its
neighbourhoods. However, taking into account the dramatically higher level of aid
from member states (at the end of the 2000s $43 billion, $48 billion including
Map 6.9 Origin of FDI in Mediterranean neighbour countries and importance of these targets for
investors, 2008–12
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Map 6.10 Number of deaths across the Mediterranean, 1994–2011
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Norway and Switzerland) than directly from the EU ($13 billion), the geography of
European aid viewed as a whole does not reveal any neighbourhood strategy. In
reality, European aid is massive to recent (Central Europe) and potential member
states and dramatically less to countries of its neighbourhood policy. The latter are
consequently left squeezed between the prevailing logic of accession and Europe’s
determination to be a global actor aiding all the regions around the world.
The European Commission’s ﬁnancing of Euromed is for the most part
dependent on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI),
although numerous other European funds are also involved for Ofﬁcial
Development Aid (ODA). A geographic breakdown of the application of total EU
funds to development is difﬁcult to establish. We could calculate the consolidated
disbursements of total EU funds to the Mediterranean for the year 2009: the amount
is €1.2 billion, that is to say 11.5 % of all EU aid (compared to 6.5 % in 2000, we
are speaking here of the ofﬁcial Mediterranean neighbourhood that is to say without
Turkey). Expressed in Euros per capita, however, the future member states stand
out clearly as the primary target of the EU’s aid policy. To these subsidies are to be
added subsidised loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the EIB, but the latter organisations undervalue the
Mediterranean neighbourhood. If we consolidate the entire ﬁnancial resources of
the EU (net balance of the EU operating budget for member states, ODA from the
EU namely thanks to the ENPI, EIB and EBRD commitments), €261 per capita
goes to new member states, €145 per capita to future member states of the former
Yugoslavia and €45 to Turkey, €26 to the eastern European neighbourhood, but
only €13 to Mediterranean counterparts (and falling) and just €11 excluding
Palestine—much less than to Russia and only slightly more than to Central Asia. In
contrast to the hopes that presided over its launch, the Union for the Mediterranean
(UfM) is not currently contributing any additional private ﬁnancing, with the bulk
of UfM community funding provided under the European neighbourhood policy.
Nonetheless, international donors are beginning to step up, notably for the
Mediterranean Solar Plan, with private investors possibly not far behind.
Not only is this European Aid too small, it is also too scattered to impact
territories and societies. The economic and ﬁnancial pillar of Barcelona offered
multiple lines of action to the Association Agreements through which the Euromed
policy has been implemented, such as gradual establishment of a free-trade area,
deep regional integration, modernisation of SEMC production structures, social
development to minimise the effects of economic openness, promotion of women’s
role in development and so forth. During the second phase of the program (MEDA
II funding, 2000–2006), the scope of possible actions expanded further due to the
reinforcement of the “security pillar”. However, the MEDA II evaluation report
(European Commission 2009) made numerous simultaneous recommendations,
amongst them maintaining budget support of institutional reforms, strengthening
justice, upholding democratisation and human rights, promoting expansion of the
role of civil society, increasing the allocation of resources to capital investment in
SMEs and responding to regional “crucial questions”. The European neighbour-
hood policy, for its part, conﬁrmed these ambitious directions. The ENPI
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(2007–2013) plaid a role in all development areas: trade, environment, climate
change, peace and security, agriculture, ﬁshing, social aspects (health, education,
professional training), employment and labour, migration, research and innovation,
information society, sound governance, taxation—not to mention consideration of
the gender balance, children’s rights and defence of indigenous peoples!
To which actors has the funding been in fact allocated? A large share of this
funding takes the form of budget support: 36 % during MEDA II and 38 % with the
ENPI (some sources being associated with even higher proportions). The private
sector received only 10–20 %. Although agriculture accounts for one-fourth of the
GDP in most SEMCs, it was almost entirely overlooked. Before the Arab spring the
European Commission’s Mediterranean policy was therefore characterized as fol-
lows: a low ﬁnancial priority, for a varied range of actions across an extremely
broad scope and, for the most part, taking the form of budget support for various
ministries.
Launched after the Arab Spring during the G8 summit of Deauville in May
2011, the Deauville partnership associates the EU, international donors such as the
World Bank, the IMF or the African Development bank, and Arab sovereign funds.
The promised money (at that time one spoke of tens of billions dollars) was sup-
posed to support the Arab countries in transition. Since then, some European
programmes have indeed been enhanced such as FP7 and Erasmus Mundus in the
Mediterranean, European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development (ENPARD) programme in particular in Tunisia, and the mandate of
the EDRB has been enlarged to the Mediterranean countries in transition. The Mach
2013 Communication on the new Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union
(2013) proposed to raise the European money to the neighbourhoods by 22 % in
2014–2020. It is too soon to measure the impact of the money that will be actually
dedicated to the Mediterranean neighbour regions.
6.2.3 Regionalism: A Slow but a Real Trend Toward
Regional Deep Integration
In spite of all this, the Mediterranean neighbourhood policy has already had four
positive political outcomes. First is the practice taken up by the governments of
countries within the region of interacting with one another either at a ministerial
level. Second is openness to international commerce in the form of both trade and
FDI, thanks to the Agreements with the EU. The third positive outcome is this
macroeconomic stabilisation of the Mediterranean neighbour economies since the
1980s. Fourth, and not least, is the steps taken towards deep integration between the
two Mediterranean shores in the following concerted regulations:
– Financial markets: regulators have established a Euro-Mediterranean network.
– Environment: initiatives date as far as 1975 and the launch of the UNEP
Mediterranean Action Plan. However, little progress has since been made on
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one of that project’s symbolic objectives, pollution reduction in the
Mediterranean Sea. The UfM has made a priority of pollution control in the
Mediterranean, conﬁrming the importance of the environmental theme to
regional integration. On the other hand, the environment could also become a
source of discord between the two shores as environmental standards increas-
ingly create a non-tariff barrier blocking European markets to agricultural
exporters in third countries including Mediterranean (e.g. possible European
penalisation of food imports that would have used road transport).
– Energy: the Barcelona process ministers opted in 2003 to move towards inte-
grated gas and electricity markets between the Mediterranean neighbours and
Europe. National agencies responsible for energy savings and renewable energy
formed a regional network called MEDENER. The UfM’s decision, in 2008, to
launch the Mediterranean Solar Plan presumes a certain heightening of coop-
eration in this regard, whether in terms of solar production, electrical inter-
connection infrastructures or regulatory aspects.
– Transport: the Euromed Transport Forum has led to a joint master plan for
transport infrastructures (2007) destined to cover the entire regional territory and
for ﬁnancing of the ﬁrst elements of this system. The UfM’s Motorways of the
Sea project is an extension of this action.
Since the rise of the Arab Spring, the European Union calls for a renewed
Mediterranean partnership; it will clearly no longer be based on public aid. Aid will
remain necessary to help countries engaged in a difﬁcult transition such as Tunisia,
but the regional strategy can no longer rely on subsidies. Is the UfM, which was
launched in order to promote private projects, the solution? One could estimate that a
juxtaposition of projects will not be sufﬁcient. On-going political and academic
debates are discussing (i) political conditionality: from now on, no Mediterranean
neighbour should be supported by European money if it is not involved in a genuine
democratisation and the rule of law; (ii) stronger support of the production system,
better convergence of economic norms and standards, and constitution of a
Euro-Mediterranean development bank. Several years ago, the European
Commission (2011) had launched accurate prospects in its communication of March
8th 2011: liberalisation of professional mobility, substantial increase of EIB’s loans,
enlargement of the EBRD’s mandate to Mediterranean neighbours, and project of a
“Euro-Mediterranean Community of Energy”: will it be followed up?
6.3 Strategic Synthesis: Time to Political Boldness
in the Euromed Process
Four ﬁelds appear of utmost importance in the relationship between the EU and its
Mediterranean neighbourhoods: water, agriculture, energy, mobility.
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6.3.1 Avoiding Water Wars
Of course, water is a very local resource, but a regional cooperation could turn it
from a political threat into an economical asset. Notwithstanding the impact of
global warming, the Mediterranean is already experiencing problems in local access
to water and sanitation that at times lead to water conflicts. Yet water could become
the cornerstone of a high-level economic channel and an ambitious international
cooperation program. The priorities are well known: efﬁcient use of water and water
demand driven management; improved local and national governance in order to
obtain clear contracts of water supply; pricing that is economically appropriate,
territorially efﬁcient and socially fair; legal and ﬁnancial security of investments to
facilitate public-private partnerships, especially for sanitation.
Since 1976, Mediterranean water issues have been at the centre of numerous
debates, and yet results have not made much progress. What the region needs is
better coordination and the involvement of all concerned actors i.e. not only Water
ministers but also Agriculture since agriculture uses the three quarters of these
countries’ water, and Urban planning authorities as well as operators and local
authorities.
What could be designed is a Mediterranean Water Agency (Comair et al. 2010).
Its role would be to coordinate the actions of the numerous institutions and NGOs
focusing on water in the Mediterranean. The Agency’s charter would echo the
common principles about pricing and clear contracts which would need to be
respected to receive funding from public and private international donors. Its
missions would be information, promotion of new water practices for agriculture,
exchange of experience and expertise, vocational training and research, hydro
diplomacy that is mediation on trans-boundary waters. When it comes to its gov-
ernance, a Euro-Mediterranean Water Council could group representatives of Heads
of State of participating countries, major towns in the region and directors of NGOs
and institutions working with water in the Mediterranean, to determine the
Agency’s strategic lines. In a second phase, the running of the Agency itself and its
executive decisions could be entrusted to professionals representing basins or other
relevant areas—and not the public water administration alone—covering all actions
necessary for integrated water and sanitation management.
Is it idealistic? It is not: the Mediterranean neighbours adapt their regulation
closer to the EC Water Framework Directive. They set up water supply agencies
according to European patterns. They acknowledge that they need European kno-
whow. Conversely, European stakeholders acknowledge that there are business
opportunities in the Mediterranean, that a good local governance of water man-
agement is an excellent way to promote citizens’ participation and democracy, and
to avoid possible water wars.
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6.3.2 The Need for a Food Security and Agricultural Policy
The issue of food will become a crucial problem for the Mediterranean neighbours
owing to (i) growing population in the South and East of the Mediterranean, with
almost 400 million people to feed by 2030; (ii) rising nutritional imbalances and
diseases linked to the gradual abandoning of the Mediterranean diet made up of
fruits, vegetables, olive oil and ﬁsh; (iii) deteriorating ecosystems, global warming,
reduction of available farming land and water resources, with serious effects on the
potential of local production, which currently provides more than 25 million jobs in
the region.
The consequence for these countries is a rising biological and economic food
deﬁcit, increased dependency on imports coming from instable international mar-
kets. It has to be remembered that the political unrest in Tunisia began a couple of
years ago with riots due to bread prices. If nothing is done, further social, economic
and ecological disasters are inevitable. Europe needs to go beyond the discussions
on Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements that have been dragging on for thirty
years (Fig. 6.6). Experts and scientists discuss the idea of a new Mediterranean
policy for agriculture and food based on Europe’s half-century CAP experience:
(i) encouraging more local food production through signiﬁcant investment in R&D
and training, and by setting up inter-professional channels, plus regulations to
improve product quality; (ii) promoting the Mediterranean diet by educating,
developing geographic labels and setting up communication plans around the world
with a view to conquering markets; (iii) creating regional food security by stimu-
lating North-South and South-South complementarities via mid-term supply con-
tracts, security stocks of strategic products (cereals and oleaginous plants) and—
why not?—Euro-Mediterranean commercial preference for all food products.
Is it idealistic? It is not: the central European states’ membership has been
prepared and accompanied by a strong commitment of the EU vis-à-vis their
agricultural and rural modernisation. Why would not the methods of the CAP be
adapted to the Mediterranean neighbours, as it has begun to be thanks to the
ENPARD programme?
6.3.3 A “Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community”?
Euro-Mediterranean policy orientations in this ﬁeld are threefold:
– Energy security: the goal is to make both supplies and commercial markets
secure. Securing supplies is as relevant for European countries as it is for
Mediterranean neighbours that do not produce hydrocarbons. In partner coun-
tries, ten million people still have no access to energy and their demand for
primary energy is set to rise by 5 % per year up to 2030; in particular, electricity
demand is increasing at 6–8 % per year, with critical supply situations in
countries like Egypt. A deep regional integration would imply that an agreement
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between Euro-Mediterranean countries relates to supply security as a whole,
both South-North and South-South. The issue of securing markets calls for
preserving long-term gas agreements, which the European commission has
hitherto not wanted to accept for the sake of liberalism and a strong belief in
spot markets. The energy world has only experienced producers’ organisation
(OPEC): could a brand new organisation that would associate producers and
consumers not be experienced at a macro-regional level?
– Industrial development: we said that energy represents considerable industrial
potential for the whole region. A technological and industrial co-development
project could be set up, provided that Euro-Mediterranean countries can tran-
scend shallow commercial relationships. The UfM could be a useful vehicle for
such cooperation, which would positively balance Gazprom’s increasing
negotiating power on the European market.
– Environmental protection: the EU’s Climate and energy package 2008 directive
sets an ambitious ceiling on European energy consumption with a minimum
share of 20 % of renewable energy in 2020. Its Article 9 is a potentially
important cooperation tool, since EU countries will be authorized to include in
their energy balance renewable energy produced outside the EU notably from
Mediterranean neighbours—hence the Mediterranean Solar Plan. These coun-
tries are also making an effort by adopting environmental measures, although
these remain insufﬁcient. The countries of the two shores of the Mediterranean
could very well adopt similar objectives and ceilings of their energy con-
sumption balance, and jointly promote new ﬁnancing tools for carbon reduction.
Is it idealistic? It is not: notwithstanding the huge Mediterranean markets in the
energy ﬁeld and the envisaged projects (MSP, Desertec, Medgrid), Europe will be
increasingly dependent upon energy imports, imperatively needs to secure its
procurement and not to rely excessively on Russia. Besides, the environmental
impact of any poor energy transition would not respect any border: it is in the
interest of the whole Euro-Mediterranean region to complement this transition in a
collaborative way (Ben Abdallah et al. 2013).
6.3.4 From “Migration” to “Mobility”
Such policy orientations suppose a real professional mobility in the region, instead
of the counterproductive and humiliating hard visa regimes that prevail in the
Euro-Mediterranean area. The political stake is to move from an administrative
migration approach to an economic approach based on mobility (Beckouche and
Lebras 2011). Is it idealistic?
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